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RULE 26.1 CERTIFICATION 
 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, amici the American 
Hospital Association, Association of American Medical Colleges, Catholic Health 
Association of the United States, Federation of American Hospitals, National 
Association of Children’s Hospitals, and National Association of Public Hospitals 
and Health Systems make the following disclosure statement: 
 Each of the above-named amici is a nonprofit association representing 
America’s hospitals.   
 1. Are the amici publicly held corporations or other publicly held   
  entities?  No. 
 
 2. Do the amici have any parent corporations?  No. 
 
 3. Is 10% or more of the stock of any amici owned by a publicly held  
  corporation or other publicly held entity?  No. 
 
 4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held  
  entity that has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the   
  litigation (Local Rule 26.1(b))?  No publicly held corporation or other  
  publicly held entity has a direct financial interest in the outcome  
  of this litigation due to the participation of the amici. 
 
 5. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?  No. 
  
       /s/ Catherine E. Stetson____________ 
       Catherine E. Stetson 
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IN THE 
United States Court of Appeals  
for the Fourth Circuit 
_______________ 
Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058 
_______________ 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, EX REL. KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, II, 
 Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
 
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS,  
 Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Virginia 
No. 3:10CV188-HEH (Hudson, J.) 
_______________ 
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION 
ET AL. IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AND REVERSAL 
_______________ 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
The American Hospital Association, Association of American Medical 
Colleges, Catholic Health Association of the United States, Federation of 
American Hospitals, National Association of Children’s Hospitals, and National 
Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems (the “Hospital Associations”) 
respectfully submit this brief as amici curiae.1 
                                            
1  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29, amici certify that all parties 
have consented to the filing of this brief.  Amici likewise certify that no party’s 
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2   
The American Hospital Association (“AHA”) represents nearly 5,000 
hospitals, health care systems, and networks, plus 37,000 individual members.  
AHA members are committed to improving the health of communities they serve 
and to helping ensure that care is available to, and affordable for, all Americans.  
The AHA educates its members on health care issues and advocates to ensure that 
their perspectives are considered in formulating health care policy. 
 The Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”) represents about 
300 major non-federal teaching hospitals, all 134 allopathic medical schools, and 
the clinical faculty and medical residents who provide care to patients there.  
 The Catholic Health Association of the United States (“CHA”) is the 
national leadership organization for the Catholic health ministry.  CHA’s more 
than 2,000 members operate in all 50 states and offer a full continuum of care, 
from primary care to assisted living.  CHA works to advance the ministry’s 
commitment to a just, compassionate health care system that protects life. 
The Federation of American Hospitals (“FAH”) is the national 
representative of investor-owned or managed community hospitals and health 
systems.  FAH has nearly 1,000 member hospitals in 46 states and the District of 
                                                                                                                                             
counsel authored this brief in whole or in part; no party or party’s counsel 
contributed money intended to fund the brief’s preparation or submission; and no 
person other than amici and their members and counsel contributed money 
intended to fund the brief’s preparation or submission.  
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Columbia.  These members include rural and urban teaching and non-teaching 
hospitals and provide a wide range of acute, post-acute, and ambulatory services.   
 The National Association of Children’s Hospitals (“N.A.C.H.”) is a trade 
organization that supports its 141 hospital members in addressing public policy 
issues.  N.A.C.H.’s mission is to promote the health and well-being of children and 
their families through support of children’s hospitals and health systems. 
 The National Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems (“NAPH”) 
is comprised of some 140 of the nation’s largest metropolitan safety net hospitals 
and health systems, committed to providing health care to all without regard to 
ability to pay.  NAPH represents members’ interests in matters before Congress, 
the Executive Branch, and the courts. 
The six Hospital Associations represent virtually every hospital and health 
system in the country—public and private; urban and rural; teaching and children’s 
hospitals; investor-owned and non-profit.  Their members will be deeply affected 
by the outcome of this case.  American hospitals are committed to the well-being 
of their communities and offer substantial community-benefit services.  As part of 
that mission, they dedicate massive resources to caring for the uninsured.  The 
uninsured, after all, need health care like everyone else.  Nearly every hospital with 
an emergency department is required to provide emergency services to anyone, 
regardless of ability to pay.  And even when an uninsured patient arrives planning 
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to pay his or her own way, that patient may struggle to pay for an extended stay.  
The upshot:  Hospitals treat tens of millions of uninsured individuals each year, 
and most of that care is uncompensated.  Indeed, in 2009 alone, hospitals provided 
more than $39 billion in uncompensated care to the uninsured and under-insured.  
American Hosp. Ass’n, Uncompensated Hospital Care Cost Fact Sheet 4 (Dec. 
2010) (“Fact Sheet”);2 see also J. Hadley et al., Covering The Uninsured In 2008: 
Current Costs, Sources Of Payment, And Incremental Costs 403, Health Affairs 
(Aug. 25, 2008) (“Covering The Uninsured”).3  And while hospitals do all they can 
to assist patients, burdens on uninsured individuals remain heavy.  Millions of 
families are just one major illness from financial ruin.   
That is why the Hospital Associations favored enactment of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).  While the legislation is not perfect, 
it would extend coverage to millions more Americans.  To undo the ACA now 
would be to maintain an unacceptable status quo—a result that is neither prudent 
nor compelled by the Constitution.   
                                            
2 Available at http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2010/pdf/10uncompensatedcare.pdf.   
3 Available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/27/5/w399. 
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5   
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CLAIM THAT UNINSURED INDIVIDUALS ARE “INACTIVE” 
 IS LEGALLY IRRELEVANT. 
 
 The individual-mandate argument embraced by the District Court is 
premised on the notion that, by requiring many Americans to obtain health 
insurance, Congress is regulating inactivity.  Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 
728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 782 (E.D. Va. 2010).  Thus the Commonwealth has described 
the individual mandate as “impos[ing] a penalty for what amounts to passive 
inactivity” and thereby “compel[ling] an unwilling person to perform an 
involuntary act.”  Id. at 772, 779.  These contentions fail for at least three separate 
reasons.  Amici address the first two only briefly, as they are more fully set forth 
by the Government.  See Brief of the United States (“U.S. Br.”) 34-44, 48-50. 
 First, the Commonwealth’s argument that “activity” is an independent 
requirement of congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause is mistaken.  
Though the Commonwealth may strive mightily to suggest otherwise, the Supreme 
Court has never created an “activity” requirement.  On the contrary, the Court has 
used the term only as a descriptor in discussing the broad outlines of Congress’s 
power, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (explaining that legal 
standards for the Commerce Clause “are not precise formulations, and in the nature 
of things they cannot be”), and has not used it in every instance when describing 
congressional power.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) 
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(Congress may regulate “a practice” that poses “a threat to the national market”).  
Nor would it make sense to require “activity” as a separate prong of the Commerce 
Clause analysis.  The relevant question under the Commerce Clause is not whether 
Congress is targeting activity, but whether the object of congressional regulation is 
causing a substantial “impact on commerce.”  Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 
196 n.27 (1968).   
 Indeed, to superimpose an activity requirement “is to plunge the law in 
endless difficulties,” Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-590 
(1937), because whether a regulated individual is engaged in relevant activity 
depends on one’s perspective:  As we discuss infra at 19-22, almost any individual 
subject to regulation can be described as “active” or “inactive,” depending on the 
level of generality one adopts.  The law does not turn on these sorts of malleable 
distinctions.  And when such distinctions have been created in the past, they have 
quickly been abandoned as unworkable failures.  See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111, 120 (1942) (“[Q]uestions of the power of Congress are not to be decided by 
reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such 
as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’ * * * .”).   
 Second, even if “activity” were required to justify a free-standing regulation, 
and even if it were absent here—which it is not, as we discuss at length below—
that would be irrelevant.  The individual mandate is not a free-standing regulation; 
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it is, instead, an important component of the ACA’s comprehensive regulatory 
reform of the interstate health care and health insurance markets.  See Mead v. 
Holder, Civ. Action No. 10-950 (GK), __ F. Supp. 2d. __, 2011 WL 611139, at 
*17 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011) (“[T]he individual mandate is best viewed not as a 
stand-alone reform, but as an essential element of the larger regulatory scheme 
contained in the ACA.”).  As such, Congress has the authority to enact it.  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Raich, Congress is well within its Commerce Clause 
authority when it regulates individuals—even individuals not participating in 
interstate commerce—as an integral part of “a lengthy and detailed statute creating 
a comprehensive framework” governing a larger interstate market.  545 U.S. at 24; 
accord Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n.17 (1981) (“It is enough that the 
challenged provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program and that the 
regulatory scheme when considered as a whole satisfies this test.”).  The ACA is “a 
lengthy and detailed statute creating a comprehensive framework” governing an 
interstate market if ever there was one.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 24.  Because the 
individual mandate plays an integral role in facilitating Congress’s regulation of 
that market, it is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
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8   
II. THE CLAIM THAT UNINSURED INDIVIDUALS ARE “INACTIVE” 
 IS FACTUALLY INCORRECT. 
 
 For both of these reasons, the Commonwealth’s challenge to the ACA fails.  
But amici wish to focus in greater detail on a third, independent reason why this 
Court should reverse:  Even if the Commerce Clause limited Congress to the 
regulation of “activity,” the requirement would be met in this case because 
uninsured Americans unquestionably participate in relevant economic activity—
they obtain health care services.  Indeed, the uninsured engage in that activity in 
massive numbers and with great frequency.  The vast majority of uninsured 
individuals receive health care services regularly, and the cost (to the patients 
themselves, those who treat them, and taxpayers) is extraordinary.  Thus an 
individual’s decision to purchase or decline health insurance is nothing other than a 
decision about whether he will pay, or ask others to pay, for existing and future 
health care costs—i.e., how he will pay for services he will receive.  That is 
quintessential economic activity.     
 The Commonwealth can assert that the uninsured are “passive” and engaged 
in mere “inactivity” only by focusing exclusively on the health insurance market 
and ignoring the broader market Congress chose to regulate through the ACA—the 
health care market.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A).  The Court should reject this 
invitation to redefine the lens through which Congress viewed the facts.  Congress 
was entitled to perceive its task as the regulation of the whole health care market, 
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and to recognize that health insurance serves as a financing mechanism in that 
broader market.4  Under rational basis review, the Court must “respect the level of 
generality at which Congress chose to act.”  United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 
25, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 22). 
 A. Because The Uninsured Are Virtually Certain To Accrue Health 
   Care Costs, The Decision To Purchase Or Decline Insurance Is 
   “Economic Activity.”   
 
 All Americans—insured and uninsured alike—make use of the health care 
system, thus accruing health care costs.  Given this reality, all individuals must 
make a decision as to how to finance these costs.  That decision is economic 
activity, and the individual mandate regulates this marketplace behavior.   
 1. Simply stated, uninsured Americans are engaged in economic activity 
because they seek and obtain large amounts of health care, and someone must pay 
the tab.  In 2008 alone, the most recent year for which full statistics are available, 
the uninsured received $86 billion worth of health care from all providers.  
                                            
4  In any event, the health insurance market and the health care market are 
inextricably linked.  As the District Court for the District of Columbia recently 
acknowledged, because health care providers pass certain uncompensated health 
care costs on to private insurers, “the individual decision to forgo health insurance, 
when considered in the aggregate, leads to substantially higher insurance premiums 
for those other individuals who do obtain coverage.”  Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at 
*16.  Higher premiums may, in turn, dissuade some consumers from purchasing 
health insurance, increasing the size of the uninsured population and thereby 
ultimately increasing the burden on health care providers.  In sum, efforts to 
regulate payment in the health care market invariably will affect the health 
insurance market and vice versa. 
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Covering The Uninsured 399, 402-403; see infra at 13-15.  The uninsured also 
made more than 20 million visits to hospital emergency rooms.  U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., New Data Say Uninsured Account for Nearly One-Fifth 
of Emergency Room Visits (July 15, 2009).5  And without the individual mandate, 
those numbers likely would continue to rise.  The number of adults aged 18-64 
who go without health insurance for some portion of the year has been increasing 
steadily over the past few years.  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vital 
Signs: Access to Health Care (Nov. 9, 2010).6  Approximately 50 million people 
fell into this category over the course of the past twelve months.  Id.   
 The vast majority of these millions of uninsured individuals—at least 94 
percent—seek and receive health care services at some point.  J. E. O’Neill and 
D.M. O’Neill, Who Are the Uninsured?  An Analysis of America’s Uninsured 
Population, Their Characteristics and Their Health 21 & Table 9 (2009) (“Who Are 
The Uninsured”).7  For example, 68 percent of the uninsured population had a 
routine check-up in the past five years, and 50 percent had one in the past two 
years.  Id. at 20.  Sixty-five percent of uninsured women had a mammogram within 
the last five years; 80 percent of uninsured women had a Pap smear in that time 
frame; and 86 percent of uninsured individuals had a blood pressure check.  Id. at 
                                            
5  Available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/07/20090715b.html. 
6  Available at http://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/HealthcareAccess/index.html.   
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20-22 & Table 9.  The takeaway is simple enough:  “[T]he uninsured receive 
significant amounts of healthcare[.]”  Id. at 24.  The uninsured thus are not 
“inactive” in the health care market; they are frequent participants.  And their 
decision to decline health insurance is an economic decision directly related to the 
services they routinely receive.  It is a decision about how to pay—or ask others to 
pay—for services rendered. 
 2. Nor is there any doubt that the overwhelming majority of uninsured 
individuals do—and must—participate in this market, even absent the individual 
mandate.  Nearly all people, sooner or later, receive health care whether they 
would have chosen to or not.  When a person has a medical crisis, or is in a car 
accident, or falls and breaks a limb, he or she is transported to the hospital and 
provided care.  Most Americans thus cannot simply “exit” the health care market.  
The choice they face, instead, is how to pay for the care they inevitably will 
receive.8  By forgoing insurance, individuals simply shift the burden of their health 
care payments to others.  See infra at 13-17.  The health care market is unique in 
this respect.  The combination of actions it requires of consumers—accepting 
                                                                                                                                             
7  Available at http://epionline.org/studies/oneill_06-2009.pdf.  
8  That some small percentage of Americans never receives health care does not 
change the constitutional calculus.  Congress may consider and regulate the market 
in the aggregate, and the courts will not “excise individual components of that 
larger scheme.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22; see also Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 192-193. 
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services and deciding how to pay for them—is economic activity, pure and simple, 
and is subject to congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause.  
 3. The Commonwealth’s “passivity” argument also obscures an 
important reality:  Although the uninsured population seeks and receives 
significant amounts of preventive care, the uninsured still receive far less 
preventive care than the insured.  Who Are The Uninsured at 20-22 & Table 9.  
The decision of some uninsured individuals to put off regular preventive care 
actually increases their activity in the health care market in the long run.  That is 
because “[d]elaying or forgoing needed care can lead to serious health problems, 
making the uninsured more likely to be hospitalized for avoidable conditions.”  
Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Uninsured & the Difference 
Health Care Makes 2 (Sept. 2010).9  As the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention observed:  “Approximately 40 percent of persons in the United States 
have one or more chronic disease[s], and continuity in the health care they receive 
is essential to prevent complications, avoidable long-term expenditures, and 
premature mortality.”  J. Reichard, CDC: Americans Uninsured at Least Part of the 
Year on the Rise, Harming Public Health, CQ Healthbeat News (Nov. 9, 2010) 
(emphasis added).  For example, “[s]kipping care for hypertension can lead to 
stroke and costly rehabilitation” and “[s]kipping it for asthma can lead to 
                                            
9  Available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/1420-12.pdf. 
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hospitalization.”  Id.  This is not mere rhetoric.  Studies have shown that “[l]ength 
of stay” in the hospital is “significantly longer” for uninsured patients who suffer 
from heart attacks, stroke, and pneumonia than for insured patients with those 
conditions—a disparity researchers attribute at least in part to “uninsured patients’ 
lack of access to primary care and preventive services.”  E. Bakhtiari, In-Hospital 
Mortality Rates Higher for the Uninsured, HealthLeaders Media (June 14, 2010).10  
For this reason, too, it makes little sense to suggest that people can declare 
themselves out of the health care market and commit—categorically, but of 
necessity hypothetically—to “us[ing] no resources.”  App. Br. 21.  Any decision to 
avoid the market in the short term simply produces more market activity in the 
medium and long term.  Congress had the authority to recognize as much, and to 
regulate uninsureds’ choice about who will pay for that market activity. 
B. Care Provided To The Uninsured Costs Billions Per Year, And 
Everyone In The Nation Helps To Pay The Bill. 
 
 Uninsured Americans, in short, regularly obtain health care services and 
decide how (and whether) to pay for them—“activities” in the market by any 
measure.  And those services are costly.  As mentioned above, the uninsured pay a 
substantial portion of the bill themselves—a whopping $30 billion in 2008 alone.  
Covering The Uninsured 399.  But an even greater share is borne by hospitals, 
                                            
10  Available at http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/QUA-
252419/InHospital-Mortality-Rates-Higher-for-the-Uninsured.html. 
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health systems, doctors, insurers, and even other patients.  Because the uninsured 
create an enormous cost for the market, the activity they engage in is “economic,” 
and Congress may regulate it.   
1. To begin with the providers:  Of the $86 billion in care the uninsured 
received in 2008, about $56 billion was uncompensated care provided by hospitals, 
doctors, clinics, and health-care systems.11  That $56 billion exceeds the gross 
domestic product of some 70 percent of the world’s nations.  Covering The 
Uninsured 399, 403; see T. Serafin, Just How Much is $60 Billion?, Forbes 
Magazine (June 27, 2006).12  All hospitals and health care providers, large and 
small, shoulder these uncompensated-care costs.  See National Ass’n of Pub. Hosp. 
& Health Sys., What is a Safety Net Hospital? 1 (2008).13  But the costs fall 
particularly heavily on “core safety-net” hospitals—the term for hospitals or health 
systems that serve a substantial share of uninsured, Medicaid, and other vulnerable 
patients.  Institute of Med., America’s Health Care Safety Net: Intact But 
                                            
11  This is derived by subtracting $30 billion in uninsured self-payment from the 
$86 billion total.  See supra at 9-10.  Of the $56 billion in uncompensated care, 
some $35 billion is provided by hospitals, and the rest by doctors, clinics, and other 
providers.  Covering The Uninsured 402-403. 
12  Available at http://www.forbes.com/2006/06/27/billion-donation-gates-
cz_ts_0627buffett.html. 
13  Available at http://literacyworks.org/hls/hls_conf_materials/ 
WhatIsASafetyNetHospital.pdf. 
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Endangered (2000).14  For these hospitals, uncompensated care amounts to some 
21 percent of total costs.  What is a Safety Net Hospital? 1. 
To be sure, hospitals bear many of these expenses as part of their charitable 
mission—but that does not change the fact that an uninsured individual’s decision 
to seek care is, and triggers, economic activity.  A description of how hospitals 
work to serve uninsured patients illustrates the point.  As noted above, nearly every 
hospital with an emergency department is required to provide emergency services 
to anyone, regardless of ability to pay.  See Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act of 1986 (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  But even when the 
patient’s need does not rise to the level of an emergency, hospitals provide free or 
deeply discounted care.  Most hospitals’ policies “specify that certain patients,” 
such as “those who do not qualify for Medicare or other coverage and with 
household incomes up to a specified percentage of the Federal Poverty Level or 
‘FPL,’ ” will not be charged at all for the care they receive.  Healthcare Fin. Mgmt. 
Ass’n, A Report from the Patient Friendly Billing Project 8 (2005).15  Other 
patients, such as those “with incomes up to some higher specified percentage of the 
FPL,” will “qualify for discounts on their hospital bills.”  Id.   
                                            
14  Available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2000/ 
Americas-Health-Care-Safety-Net/Insurance%20Safety%20Net%202000%20% 
20report%20brief.pdf. 
15  Available at http://www.hfma.org/HFMA-Initiatives/Patient-Friendly-
Billing/PFB-2005-Uninsured-Report. 
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Most uninsured (and under-insured) patients with incomes that exceed these 
levels, however, also face difficulty paying for services, especially if they require 
an extended hospital stay.  Despite their incomes, some may qualify for reduced-
price care under hospital policies that assist the “medically indigent”—i.e., 
“patients whose incomes may be relatively high, but [whose] hospital bills exceed 
a certain proportion of their annual household income or assets.”  Id. at 11.  For 
others, hospitals offer financial counseling, flexible payment plans, interest-free 
loans, and initiatives that help patients apply for grants or Medicaid.  Id. at 11-15.  
These services advance hospitals’ missions to serve the community—but they also 
require substantial time and resources that add to the already massive costs 
hospitals absorb to treat the uninsured. 
2. In the final analysis, hospitals and other health care providers provide 
tens of billions of dollars worth of uncompensated care per year, including services 
to the uninsured and under-insured.  Fact Sheet 4.  They do not shoulder the burden 
alone, however.  Supplemental Medicare and Medicaid payment programs also 
fund care for the uninsured—in other words, American taxpayers share the cost.  
Covering The Uninsured 403-404.  State and local governments—taxpayers 
again—likewise fund certain of these expenses.  Id. at 405.  Finally, insured 
patients (and their insurers) end up effectively paying some portion of the bills 
generated by their uninsured counterparts:  As hospitals and other providers absorb 
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costs of uncompensated care, they have fewer funds to reinvest and to cover their 
ongoing expenses, and that in turn drives costs higher.  Id. at 406.  In short, the 
vast cost of health care for the uninsured is, of necessity, borne by the rest of the 
nation, and it affects prices in the health care and the health insurance markets.  To 
say the uninsured render themselves “inactive” by declining to purchase insurance 
is to ignore reality.  The uninsured still obtain health care; others just pay for it. 
C. Attempts To Analogize This Case To Lopez Fail. 
The Commonwealth argued below that it is a mere inference that uninsured 
individuals use the health care system and shift billions in costs to third parties.  
But the facts, outlined above, speak for themselves.  This case could not be further 
from those, such as Lopez, where the Supreme Court has deemed the inferential 
chain between the regulated event and the effect on commerce to be too attenuated.   
In Lopez, the chain of inferences required to connect the regulated event 
(gun ownership in a school zone) to a substantial effect on interstate commerce 
was long and winding, not to mention unquantifiable.  First, one had to assume that 
firearm possession in a school zone leads to violent crime; second, that guns in 
schools accordingly “threaten[ ] the learning environment”; third, that the 
“handicapped educational process” supposedly produced by guns in school zones 
would “result in a less productive citizenry”; and finally, that this firearm-
hampered citizenry would dampen the national economy.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-
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564.  Nearly every step in this chain was a matter of conjecture and hypothesis.  
Here, by contrast, the connection between a lack of pre-financed health-care 
purchases and interstate commerce is immediate and demonstrable:  The uninsured 
receive health care, and many cannot pay for it out of pocket.  As a result, tens of 
billions of dollars a year in costs are absorbed by third parties, distorting the 
market.  Congress found as much, see 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F), and its findings 
were not just rational—they were plainly correct.  See Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at 
*16 (“[I]individuals are actively choosing to remain outside of a market for a 
particular commodity, and, as a result, Congress’s efforts to stabilize prices for that 
commodity are thwarted.”).  No “inference” is required. 
D. The Commonwealth’s Attempt To Characterize The Behavior Of  
  The Uninsured As “Inactivity” Misperceives The Court’s Task. 
 
 The Commonwealth nonetheless has insisted that the uninsured are inactive 
in the health insurance market, that Congress is “compel[ling]” them to participate, 
and that such forced participation is “beyond the outer limits of the Commerce 
Clause and associated Necessary and Proper Clause as measured by U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent.”  Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 771-72, 779.  But this approach 
proves too much:  Nearly any behavior that has been, or could be, the object of 
legislative regulation could be characterized as “inactivity.”  The motel owners in 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), for example, 
were “inactive” in the sense that they refused to do something—serve black 
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customers—and were forced to do it by federal law.16  The farmers in Wickard 
were “inactive” in the sense that they refused to do something—participate in the 
public wheat market—and were “forc[ed] * * * into the market to buy what they 
could provide for themselves.”  317 U.S. at 129.  And one can imagine a range of 
other circumstances in which the regulated individual would be “inactive” and yet 
Congress clearly could regulate.  Take, for example, protesters who choose to sit 
passively at the entrance to nuclear power plants, refusing to move and blocking 
the way for crucial employees.  Surely Congress would be entitled to forbid that 
“inactivity” if it found that it substantially affected the interstate energy market.   
 The Commonwealth, no doubt, would respond that all of these examples 
involve some underlying active component—for example, walking to the nuclear 
facility to start the protest.  But so too here.  Uninsured individuals seek and obtain 
health care services in a massive national market.  That is an active component, 
and one that has a very substantial effect on interstate commerce.  The 
Commonwealth’s argument thus merely underscores the fact that whether a 
regulated individual is sufficiently “active” is a matter of perspective.  As the 
                                            
16  It is no answer to say that Heart of Atlanta involved motel owners who, by 
virtue of having at some point chosen to operate a hotel, were in that sense 
participating in the stream of commerce.  As explained infra at 19-22, activity is a 
matter of perspective.  Uninsured individuals are active in the stream of commerce 
to the same extent as the motel owners in Heart of Atlanta.  Motel owners operate 
motels; uninsured individuals seek and receive billions of dollars worth of health 
care services every year. 
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Mead court recognized:  “It is pure semantics to argue that an individual who 
makes a choice to forgo health insurance is not ‘acting,’ especially given the 
serious economic and health-related consequences to every individual of that 
choice.”  Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *18. 17   
That fact, in turn, dooms their case.  After all, courts are not in the business 
of overruling Congress when it comes to characterizing the relevant facts.  See 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (“We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, 
taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only 
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”); Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 190 
(“[W]here we find that the legislators * * * have a rational basis for finding a 
chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our 
investigation is at an end.’ ”) (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-
304 (1964)).  Thus, “within wide limits, it is Congress—not the courts—that 
decides how to define a class of activity.”  Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 42.  Here 
Congress found that the individual mandate “regulates activity that is commercial 
and economic in nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when 
health care is paid for[.]”  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A).  Congress was entitled to 
                                            
17  See also id. at *19 (“[A]s inevitable participants in the health care market, 
individuals cannot be considered ‘inactive’ or ‘passive’ in choosing to forgo health 
insurance.  Instead, as Defendants argue, such a choice is not simply a decision 
whether to consume a particular good or service, but ultimately a decision as to 
how health care services are to be paid and who pays for them.”). 
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understand the market in that way, just as it was entitled to conclude that motel 
owners were “active” when they refused service to black customers and that 
Roscoe Filburn was “active” when he refused to buy wheat at retail.  The only 
question for this Court is whether Congress’s determination was rational.  It was, 
for all the reasons above.    
E. The District Court’s Slippery-Slope Hypotheticals Are Inapposite. 
 
 The District Court cautioned that if Congress can require participants in the 
health care market to buy insurance, then Congress effectively will be permitted to 
exercise “unbridled . . . federal police powers.”  Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 788.  
Thus, according to the District Court, Congress could exert control over 
individuals’ “transportation, housing, or nutritional decisions.”  Id. at 781.  This 
panoply of government-control horribles is a trope favored by the Act’s detractors.  
See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Of Health & Human Services, __ F. Supp. 
2d. __, 2011 WL 285683, at *24 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (hypothesizing that 
Congress could require, for example, “that everyone above a certain income 
threshold buy a General Motors automobile”). 
 Not so.  There is a key difference between the ACA and the hypothetical 
laws described above:  Under the ACA, the activity individuals are being “forced” 
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to undertake18 is a mere financing mechanism for another activity that they already 
undertake:  consumption of health care.  Congress did not make people obtain that 
underlying product in new or different quantities, and this case does not present the 
question whether Congress could do so.  Instead, Congress made sure people pay 
for what they get.  Put another way, Congress did not make anyone buy a General 
Motors vehicle.  It instead made sure no one can drive a General Motors vehicle 
off the lot and tell the dealer to bill their neighbor (or to absorb the cost itself).19 
 The slippery-slope hypotheticals also fail for a second reason:  They 
completely ignore the fact that Congress may not assert a “substantial effect” on 
interstate commerce via unlikely inferential chains.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-
564.  For example, some have suggested that upholding the ACA could permit 
Congress to force people to consume a certain amount of broccoli each week 
merely “because broccoli is healthy.”20  But to assert that the consumption of 
                                            
18  Individuals, of course, will not actually be forced to purchase health insurance 
under the ACA.  They will instead be assessed a penalty through the tax system if 
they decline to purchase insurance.  See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1). 
19  Analogies to the auto industry also help to underscore the unusual nature of the 
health care industry.  In the auto industry—as in most industries—in order to 
receive goods or services, consumers must pay or at least commit to a payment or 
financing plan.  As discussed supra at 11, 14-17, this is not the case in the health 
care industry.  The individual mandate merely seeks to address some of the 
problems arising from this unique situation. 
20 D. Kam, U.S. judge in Pensacola weighs Florida, 19 other states’ challenge of 
health care law, Palm Beach Post News, Friday, Dec. 17, 2010 (“Palm Beach Post 
Article”). 
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broccoli substantially affects interstate commerce due to its health benefits is to 
engage in the same sort of inference-upon-inference logic that was disapproved in 
Lopez.  (The logic presumably would be something like:  Broccoli is healthy; 
people do not consume enough broccoli; consuming more broccoli will prevent 
disease; avoiding disease in this manner reduces health-care costs.  Compare 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563).  For this reason, too, the fact that Congress can regulate 
financing mechanisms in the nation’s largest economic sector hardly means it has 
“federal police powers.”  Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 788.   
 Finally, these alarmist hypotheticals are not just inapposite but unrealistic 
because they ignore the limits the political process places on Congress’s actions.  
The Supreme Court has recognized for two centuries that while the Commerce 
Clause power is broad, Congress is restrained by the electorate.  Put another way, it 
has recognized that “effective restraints on [the] exercise” of the Commerce power 
“must proceed from political, rather than from judicial, processes.”  Wickard, 317 
U.S. at 120 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat.), 197 (1824)).  To 
suggest that Congress would force all Americans to buy a particular make of 
vehicle, or buy a pound of broccoli every week, see Palm Beach Post Article, 
supra, or sleep at particular times, see id., or any of the rest of the pundits’ parade 
of fantastical hypotheticals, is to abandon all faith in representative democracy. 
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 CONCLUSION 
Hospitals will continue to care for the uninsured, as they have for 
generations, regardless of their ability to pay—and indeed, for many hospitals that 
service is at the core of their mission.  But let there be no mistake:  The choice to 
forgo health insurance is not a “passive” choice without concrete consequences.  
The health care uninsured Americans obtain has real costs.  Their decision to 
obtain care, and how to pay for it, is economic activity with massive economic 
effects, including the imposition of billions in annual costs on the national 
economy.  In regulating the national health care industry, Congress possessed 
ample authority to address those costs by changing the way uninsured Americans 
finance the services they receive. 
The District Court’s judgment should be reversed. 
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